I. Introduction
The literature on innovation has focused primar ily on the decisions offirms to engage in research and development and specifically on the interac tion between market structure and the incentives to innovate (e.g., Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1980; Lee and Wilde 1980; Reinganum 1982 Reinganum , 1983 . How ever, having engaged in innovating activity, firms also have to decide when and how to deploy the in novations. The timing of adoption ofinnovations has been studied by several authors, considering the preemptive aspects of the adoption decision (e.g., Reinganum 1981a Reinganum , 1981b Fudenberg and Tirole 1985, 1987) . How to deploy innovations to fully realize their potential rents is the focus of this paper.
The following example may illustrate the prob lem and the deployment options often available. Suppose that Valnlet, a Finnish nlanufacturer of paper machines, develops a unique and highly effective pollution control technology, which sub stantially reduces pollution originated by paper machines. As is usually the case, this innovation may be deployed in several ways. The most ob vious option faced by the firm is to keep the * We thank Pedro Pita Barros, Karel Cool, Lars-Hendrik Roller, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this work. Errors and omissions are solely the authors' responsibility.
How can a firm deploy an innovation to fully realize its rent potential? We use a game-theoretic model to study the de ployment ofinnovations that enhance the quality of an existing product. Three deployment strat egies are compared: captive use, where the firm uses the innovation to enhance the competi tive position of its own product; licensing, where the firm shares the innovation with com petitors; and indepen dent selling, where the firm incorporates the in novation in a comple mentary product or service that is sold sep arately to consumers. We study how the inter play of efficiency and competitive consid erations favors certain deployment options over others.
innovation to itself, that is, to use it captively, to create a competitive advantage in product nlarkets. Valmet may incorporate the innovation in its own paper machines to strengthen its product-market position. Paper producers that want to benefit from the innovation have to buy their paper machines from Valmet. Alternatively, the firm may share the innovation with other firms. In our example, Valmet may share the new technology with other paper machine manufacturers through licensing contracts, outsourcing agreements, or other types ofcollaborative arrange ments.l Finally, the firm may capture the rent potential of the innovation through independent selling, that is, it may use the innovation to pro duce a complementary product or service, which is sold separately to consumers. In fact, Valmet may decide to sell the pollution control de vice independently to paper producers as an add-on or an upgrade.
The deployment decision has been extensively studied fronl a trans action cost perspective (e.g., Williamson 1975 Williamson , 1985 Teece 1986 Teece , 1987 Hennart 1988 Hennart , 1991 Kogut 1988; Hill 1992; Chi 1994) . This approach proposes that firms should organize their boundary activities with other firms according to the criterion ofminimizing production and transaction costs. Transaction costs refer to the negotiating, monitoring, and enforce ment costs that have to be borne to allow an exchange between two parties. While this literature highlights the importance of transaction costs, additional insights can be gained by studying the competitive im plications of the interactions among firms' asset positions and deploy ment strategies, under given environmental constraints.
In this paper, we use a game-theoretic model to study how the combined impact ofproduction cost differences and nlarket competition affects the deployment decision ofinnovations. To focus on how com petitive considerations influence the deployment decision, our model sets aside a number of factors considered in the transaction cost liter ature. For example, we assume that there is no uncertainty about the value of the innovation and that it is possible to share the innovation with conlpetitors without diffusing the general knowledge underlying the innovation to be transferred. By focusing on the competitive impli cations of deployment decisions, our paper complements the existing literature that analyzes the deployment decision from a transaction cost perspective.
To study a broad range of deployment options, it is necessary to examine the case ofan innovation that can not only be deployed captively but also sold independently to consumers or shared with other firms through collaborative agreements. For instance, the case of cost-reducing 1. Generally speaking, the sharing of an innovation can occur by one of three means: the transfer of the skills and organization routines that make up the innovation beyond the firm that presently employs it, the purchase of the service of the innovation from the firm that possesses it, or the acquisition of the part of the firm where the innovation resides (e.g., Chi 1994). innovations would be too restrictive. Indeed, while such process in novations can be deployed captively or shared with other finns, such as competitors or suppliers ofinputs, independent selling to consumers is not a feasible option. Cost-reducing innovations typically cannot be used to produce a complementary product or service that is sold sepa rately to consumers. Consider, for example, a new production process that allows the finn to save on labor costs. Captive use and the engage ment in collaborative agreements with other finns, for example, through licensing contracts, are the only deployment options. In contrast, inno vations that enable a finn to improve the quality of an existing product or service usually allow for a broader range of deployment options. A new safety device or climate control system for automobiles, a new accessory for cameras, a new maintenance service, a better postsale service, or a new home-delivery service constitute examples of quality improving innovations.
The recent transfonnations at General Electric (GE) illustrate the importance of quality-improving innovations and how they may be deployed. As reported by Business Week (October 28, 1996, pp. 42-50) , Jack Welch, GE's fonner chainnan and CEO, launched a few years ago two companywide initiatives aimed at increasing the company's growth. The first was a drive to boost quality. The second represented a departure from captive use. Jack Welch realized that, for the con1 pany to fully appropriate the potential rents associated with its core industrial strengths in businesses as far afield as health care, aircraft engines, power generation, and utilities, GE should no longer rely on keeping these assets in-house. For example, GE Medical Systems signed exclusive multiyear service deals with big hospital chains, which involve servicing rival manufacturers' medical equipment; and GE Aircraft Engines signed a deal with British Airways (BA), under which GE was supposed to do 85% of the engine maintenance work on BA's entire fleet, including engines made by rivals Rolls-Royce and Pratt & Whitney. In these examples, GE decided to appropriate rents through independent selling. In other businesses, GE decided to share assets with finns that had complementary ones of its own. For instance, GE Transportation fonned a joint venture with electronics specialist Harris Corp. to design and sell global-positioning systems similar to those used in air-traffic control; GE Capital decided to build a global computer outsourcing business and, in 1995, joined forces with Anderson Con sulting to beat major competitors for a contract to manage LTV Corp.'s mainframe-based computer needs; and GE Power Systen1s agreed to manage power plants for independent power producers. To the extent that the engineering and management capabilities deployed by GE in these examples contribute to improving the quality of the underlying products or services, they constitute quality-improving innovations. According to Business Week, GE's efforts were" closely watched ... as a pattern for the refashioning of an industrial company in a postindus trial economy" (ibid ., pp. 43-44) .
The deployment decision of quality-improving innovations is par ticularly interesting because, as GE's example illustrates, the owner of such an asset often faces all the deployment alternatives identified previously. The firm may use the innovation captively, that is, it may incorporate the innovation in its own product, in an attempt to create a differentiation advantage. It may share the innovation with a competi tor, for example, through a licensing contract. And it may follow an independent selling strategy, that is, it may use the innovation to pro duce a new component, an add-on, an upgrade, or a complementary ser vice sold separately to consumers. Consumers may then combine this separate offering with products from competitors.
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In this paper, we study the deployment of quality-improving inno vations, comparing captive use, independent selling, and a particular form of sharing an innovation with competitors, licensing. 3 In partic ular, we analyze how cost differences and the range offeasible licensing contracts affect the deployment decision. We identify three underlying concerns that influence the choice among the different deployment options: (1) achieving cost-efficient production, (2) ensuring coordi nated pricing of the basic and enhanced products, and (3) mitigating competition within products. Furthermore, we study how the interplay of these efficiency and competitive forces favors certain deployment options relative to others. This paper is related to the industrial organization literature on technology transfer through licensing. Several aspects of the competi tive implications of deployment decisions have been identified in this literature. In general, there is an incentive to license when it results in higher industry profits, provided side payments are possible. Licens ing may increase industry profits through the replacement ofinefficient production techniques (e.g., McGee 1966; Salant 1984; Gallini and Winter 1985; Katz and Shapiro 1985) , by increasing industry denland (e.g., Shepard 1987; Farrell and Gallini 1988) , by facilitating collusion (e.g., Shapiro 1985; Lin 1996) , by eliminating R&D expenditures that are wasteful from the industry'S point of view (e.g., Gallini 1984; Gallini and Winter 1985) , or by deterring entry of a stronger competitor 2. Some quality-improving innovations cannot be used to produce a complementary product or service that is sold separately to consumers. Consider, for example, a techno logical capability that allows the production of a new engine or a new rear suspension for cars. In these cases, independent selling is not possible. Captive use and the engagement in collaborative agreements with other firms are the only possible uses of the innovation.
3. In some cases, the quality-improving innovation may have a strong tacit dimension, and, therefore, cannot be transferred through a licensing contract to a competitor. However, in such cases, the innovating firm may produce the complementary product or service and sell it to other firms. Much of what we say about licensing in this paper also applies to situations where we have such sourcing agreements.
once the patent expires, prolonging the innovating firm's dominant position in the industry (e.g., Rockett 1990) .
While this literature focuses on cost-reducing innovations or new products, comparing captive use and licensing, little attention has been paid to quality-improving innovations. Furthermore, as already nlen tioned, the deployment decision of these innovations is particularly in teresting because, besides using them captively or sharing them with competitors, for example, through licensing agreements, firms often face the possibility to follow an independent selling strategy. Our con cern in this paper is to study the deployment of quality-improving in novations, comparing these three deployment options.
We show that, as in the case of cost-reducing innovations (e.g., McGee 1966; Salant 1984; Gallini and Winter 1985; Katz and Shapiro 1985) , licensing a quality-improving innovation may increase industry profits through the replacement of inefficient production techniques. If the innovating firm has a disadvantage in the production of the un derlying (or basic) product, licensing leads to cost-efficient production. However, in the case of quality-improving innovations, cost efficiency may also be achieved through independent selling, because under this deployment strategy consumers may combine the innovation with the underlying (or basic) product offered by the most efficient firm. We discuss how, when both licensing and independent selling induce the replacement of inefficient production techniques, the choice of the op timal deployment strategy is influenced by two competitive forces: the need to coordinate pricing across the basic and enhanced products and the desire to limit competition within products. We identify situations where, in spite of increasing industry profits relative to captive use through the replacement ofinefficient production techniques, licensing is dominated by independent selling. This makes the deployment de cision of quality-improving innovations particularly complex and sug gests that independent selling is, in fact, an interesting strategy. This paper also contributes to the "resource-based" view of strategy, a prominent perspective in the strategic management field today (e.g., Rumelt 1984 Rumelt , 1987 Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1986 Barney , 1991 Dierickx and Cool 1989; Peteraf 1993; Henderson and Cockburn 1994) . This ap proach maintains that firms may be heterogeneous with respect to the bundle of resources they control. Furthermore, since some of these re sources, such as a firm's reputation or other information-based resources, are imperfectly mobile (i.e., cannot be bid away from their current em ployer) and imperfectly imitable (i.e., other firms encounter difficulty in replicating the resource on their own), resource uniqueness may persist over time.
As pointed out by Chi (1994) , a finn that owns an imperfectly mobile resource, that is, a resource that cannot be bid away from its current employer, may face the opportunity to deploy it in different ways. For example, replication of the resource under the guidance of its current employer may still be possible. 5 In other words, "finn-specific resources that are immobile across finns are not necessarily untradeable" (Chi 1994, p. 274) . This means that, in addition to choosing which resources to develop and how to accumulate them, finns have to decide how to deploy their unique (or scarce) resources to fully realize their poten tial rents (e.g., Gabel 1984; Wernerfelt 1984) . This paper addresses this issue. While the paper is framed in tenns ofinnovations, the assets examined here may correspond to imperfectly mobile and imperfectly imitable resources. In this perspective, we propose a game-theoretic model to study rent-maximizing deployment options ofquality-inlproving resources.
As explicitly recognized by several authors (e.g., Conner 1991; Mahoney and Pan dian 1992), the resource-based view can be enriched by incorporating game-theoretic models that study the implications of the interactions among competitors' resource positions and competitive strategies under given environmental constraints. As Conner puts it, "It is apparent that a resource-based approach views a finn's perfonnance as resulting from the simultaneous interaction ofat least three forces: the finn's own asset base; the asset bases of competitors; and constraints emanating fronl the broader industry and public policy environment. Although further development ofthe resource-based approach will ben efit from employment of a variety of research methods, developing the theoretical implications ofsuch complex interactions is an area in which the resource-based theory may gain from application of the new IO's game-theoretic techniques" (1991, p. 145).6 Studying alternative deployment options is meaningful only when the underlying asset is capable of generating rents. The ability of an of the "resource-based" view can be traced back, among other contributions, to David Ricardo's (1965 Ricardo's ( [1817 ) discussion of resource deployment and rents, to Selznick's (1957) notion of "distinctive competencies," to Penrose's (1959) theory about the growth of the firm, and to Nelson and Winter's (1982) evolutionary theory of the firm.
5. Nelson and Winter (1982, ch. 5 ) elaborate on the distinction between replication (i.e., the situation where a firm is trying to apply a routine it already possesses on a larger scale) and imitation (i.e., the situation where one firm is trying to copy a routine of some other firm). What distinguishes imitation from replication "is the fact that the target routine is not in any substantial sense available as a template" (p. 123). Therefore, imitation is more prob lematic than replication. Imitation with the active support of the firm being imitated is seen as an intermediate case between imitation and replication.
6. For discussions on the importance and the limitations of the use of game-theoretic modeling in the strategic management field, see also Shapiro (1989 ), Camerer (1991 , Porter (1991) , Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1991) , Saloner (1991) , and Ghemawat and McGahan (1998). asset to generate rents may be constrained by two problems. The first problem relates to mobility and imitability of the asset, two concepts that have been extensively addressed by "resource-based" theorists (e.g., Dierickx and Cool 1989; Barney 1991; Peteraf 1993) . For ex ample, competitors are interested in some kind of asset sharing agree ment only when they find it difficult to accumulate the asset internally or substitute the asset with another one.
The second problem relates to excludability, an issue that has re ceived much less attention by resource-based theorists. This problem can perhaps best be illustrated by the following example, suggested by Meade (1952) . Take the case of an apple grower and a beekeeper. The apple grower provides nectar to the beekeepers' bees. In tum, the bees provide fertilization services to the apple grower. Theoretically, one could envision an arrangement where each pays for the product (nectar) or service (fertilization) provided by the other. The reason why both are provided free of charge is "the inability of a producer of a good or service physically to exclude users, or to control the rationing of his produce among them" (Bator 1958, p. 361, footnote 8) . The problem of excludability may become particularly acute in the case of sharing assets with competitors. As discussed later, the excludability problem then acquires a particular twist, not often noted in the literature, namely, the difficulty to exclude oneself from using the asset.
II. The Model
We now introduce the game-theoretic model used to study the de ployment decision of quality-improving innovations.
Consider an industry with two firms, indexed by j 1, 2, which produce a homogeneous product XB (the basic or original product), at a constant marginal cost Cj. In addition, one firm, say, firm 2, developed a complementary product or service y that, when used with product XB, results in an enhanced (higher-quality) product XE. Specifically, one unit of the enhanced product XE consists of one unit of the basic product XB plus one unit of the innovation y. Product XE is vertically differentiated: If both products are offered at the same price, consumers strictly prefer to buy product XE to product XB. 7 Without loss of generality, we may assume that the marginal cost of production of the complementary product or service, c Y ' equals zero. The innovator, firm 2, may either be a low-cost producer (C2 < Cl) or the high-cost producer (C2 > Cl) ofthe basic product.
7. Following the industrial organization literature on vertical differentiation (e.g., Gabszewicz and Thisse 1979; Shaked and Sutton 1982) , we say that finn A has a vertical differentiation advantage over finn B if all consumers prefer the product of finn A to the product of finn B when both products are offered at the same price.
We define DB (PB, PE) 
We study the choice between captive use, independent selling, and licensing. Several licensing contracts are considered. In general, a li censing agreement may stipulate a fixed-fee F and a royalty r per unit of XE produced by the licensee. However, a royalty may not always be feasible. For example, it may be difficult for the licensor to monitor the licensee's output, which is necessary to enforce a contract specifying a royalty. Therefore, we devote a part of this paper to situations where the licensor is restricted to fixed-fee licensing contracts.
A license may be exclusive or nonexclusive. The excludability problenl mentioned previously lies at the heart of this distinction. In an exclusive license, the right to use the innovation is granted to the li censee to the exclusion of all the other firms, including the licensor. It is important to note that explicit contractual language does not neces sarily guarantee that the license is effectively exclusive. A common problem is that the licensor may be able to invent around the licensed technology. After all, it is the licensor who came up with the technology and who wrote the patent. Hence, it is the licensor who is in the best position to invent around it. If explicit contractual language is not able to prevent the licensor to do so, then, effectively, the license is nonexclusive. We consider both the case where exclusive licensing is possible (i.e., the contract is "watertight") and the case where it is not possible.
We consider a two-stage game. In stage 1, the deployment stage, firm 2 decides how to deploy the quality-improving innovation. First, the firm may follow a captive-use strategy, selling the enhanced product XE, consisting of one unit of the basic product XB and one unit of the in novation y. Second, firm 2 may choose a licensing strategy. Under the assumption that the innovating firm has all the bargaining power, firm 2 proposes a contract that allows it to capture all the gains from licens ing, subj ect to the constraint that firm 1 is willing to accept the contract. This assumption affects only the distribution ofprofits between the two firms (which is not our concern in this paper) and not the optimality oflicensing relative to the other deployment decisions. The results are unaffected by changing the distribution of bargaining power, provided that the licensor earns a nonzero share of the gains from licensing. Since side payments are possible (through the fixed fee), licensing is beneficial whenever it leads to higher joint profits.
8 Finally, finn 2 may follow an independent selling strategy, selling the complemen tary product or service y separately to consumers, who can then com bine it with the basic product offered by both finns. 9 In stage 2, the pricing stage, finns set prices simultaneously, after having observed the deployment decision.
When the innovating finn has a cost advantage in the production of the basic product (C2 < CI) or if the two finns are equally cost efficient (C2 == CI), captive use is clearly the optimal deployment decision. In this case, the innovating finn has no incentive to engage in licensing or independent selling. This is so for two reasons. First, licensing or in dependent selling does not lower production costs and, therefore, does not create any efficiency gains. Second, by using the quality-improving innovation noncaptively, the innovating finn loses its monopoly in the enhanced product (or in one ofits components, the basic product to be consumed with the complementary product or service), thereby induc ing rent dissipation due to increased competition. When the innovating finn has a cost disadvantage in the production of the basic product (C2 > CI), production efficiency favors either licens ing or independent selling over captive use. However, in this case, to track the implications ofmarket interaction and competition, we have to characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of the game. 10 This is done in section III.
III. Deployment Decision
To characterize the optimal deployment decisions when the innovating finn has a cost disadvantage in the production of the basic product (C2 > Cl), we first compare captive use and independent selling.
A. Captive Use vs. Independent Selling
Assume first that finn 2 uses the quality-improving innovation captively selling the enhanced product XE in the product market. In this case, finn 1 offers XBb charging a price PBb and finn 2 offers XB2, charging a price PB2, and XE2, charging a price PE2'
8. Since, in this model, we consider only two firms, firm 1 and firm 2, the joint profits of the two firms correspond to industry profits. As we will see later, the model can be extended to three or more firms without affecting the main results.
9. In studying independent selling, we assume that the complementary product or service is compatible with the basic product of both firms. However. in many situations the innovator may be able to make the complementary product or service compatible with the basic product of one firm and incompatible with the basic product of the other firm. As the compatibility decision has been studied elsewhere (e.g., Matutes and Regibeau 1988; Economides 1989 ), we do not consider these situations.
10. Only pure strategies equilibria are considered.
The Nash equilibrium of the resulting pricing game can be charac terized as follows. Due to competition between the two firms in XB, in equilibrium firm 1 (the low-cost firm) sells XBl charging a price PSI < C2, while firm 2 does not sell XB2 and sells XE2 charging a price PEl. (the superscript cu indicates equilibrium under captive use). II The equilib rium profits of firms 1 and 2 are given, respectively, by
Suppose now that firm 2 sells the enhancenlent independently as a complementary product or service to consumers, who can then combine it with the basic product XB offered by both firms. In this case, firm 1 offers XBl charging a price PBt, and firm 2 offers XB2 charging a price PB2 as well as y charging a price Py.
The Nash equilibrium of the resulting pricing game can be charac terized as follows. Since firm 1 faces competition of firm 2 in XB, in equilibrium firm 1 charges a price P~l < C2, ~upplying the whole market for XB; and firm 2 sells y, charging a price P~s > 0 (the superscript is in dicates equilibrium under independent selling). 12 The equilibrium pro fits of firms 1 and 2 are given, respectively, by
rr is == D (pis + pis pis). pis
To compare firm 2 's profits under captive use and independent selling assume, for a moment, that the price of the basic product is the same under these two deployment alternatives (PBI == P~l)' In this case, firm 2's profits under independent selling are always greater than or equal to its profits under captive use (II~ II~U). The intuition is as follows. Independent selling leads to low-cost production, because in equilib rium the basic product is produced only by the most efficient firm. Since the price charged by firm 1 for the basic product is smaller than or equal to firm 2 's cost ofproduction ofthat product (P~l < C2), the innovating 11. To ensure the existence of such an equilibrium, we assume that, for PBI E [CI , C2] and PE2 > C2, the profit function of firm 1 is concave in PBl and the profit function of firm 2 is concave in PE2.
12. For any Py > 0, PE ( == PB +Py) > PB, and, consequently, we may restrict our attention to situations where DB and DE have the desired properties mentioned previously. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium of this pricing game, we assume that, for PBt E [Ct, C2] and Py > 0, the profit function of firm 1 is concave in PBI and the profit function of firm 2 is concave in Py.
firm may be able to capture part of the efficiency gain. This firm nlay benefit from the fact that, under independent selling, consumers of the enhanced product buy the basic product at a price that is lower than its own cost to produce this product. We may define e C2 -P~l as a mea sure ofthe part of the efficiency gain captured by firm 2. This is the cost reduction effect of selling the complementary product or service sepa rately to consumers instead of using it captively. Now, let us drop the assumption that P~l -PBI' Indeed, the deploy ment decision affects industry structure and, therefore, it may influence the equilibrium price PBI. From the first-order conditions, it is easy to verify that PBI may be greater than, equal to, or smaller than P~l' There fore, by leading to a different equilibrium price PBI, independent selling may have a second effect on firm 2 's profit. This competition effect may either reinforce the efficiency effect or have the opposite impact. How ever, even if the competition effect has the opposite impact, it is always (weakly) donlinated by the efficiency effect. This is so because PBI P~l < e. As a consequence, firm 2 's equilibrium profits are greater or equal under independent selling than under captive use. 13 
B. Independent Selling vs. Licensing
Since captive use is dominated by independent selling, optimal deploy ment is either independent selling or licensing. To compare these two deployment options, we need to look only at joint profits, the "total size of the pie." The reason is that, under licensing, profits can be redistrib uted at will through the fixed licensing fee. Indeed, this fixed fee is a side payment that transfers profits between the two companies without af fecting joint profits. This implies that both firms can be made better off under licensing if and only ifjoint profits are greater under this deploy ment option than under independent selling.
Exclusive Licensing. Whenever possible, exclusive licensing is pre ferred over nonexclusive licensing. The major drawback ofnonexclusive licensing is increased product market competition and, consequently, lower joint profits. Furtheml0re, if the contract is "watertight", that is, exclusivity is effectively guaranteed by explicit contractual language, the optimal licensing contract sets no royalty (r = 0). This ensures that the licensee (firm 1) makes its decisions according to its true nlarginal cost, thus maximizing joint profits.
The Nash equilibrium of the ensuing pricing game can be charac terized as follows. Firm 1 supplies both XB and XE, charging a price 13. A fonnal proof of this result is given in Appendix A. From Appendix A, it can be seen that the profits offinn 2 are strictly greater under independent selling than under captive use unle~s (1) P~l = PB~ = C2 or (2) P~l < PB~ C2 and IDEE I= IDEBI. In these two cases, u II 2 II~. For ease of exposition, we focus on the general case, where finn 2's profits are strictly greater under independent selling than under captive use. 
PBI < C2 (because the two finns compete in XB
where IT I+2 denotes the joint profits of the two finns and the superscript el indicates equilibrium under exclusive licensing. 14 Both independent selling and exclusive licensing lead to cost efficient production. However, exclusive licensing has an advantage over independent selling: It leads to coordinated pricing of the basic and the enhanced products. Under independent selling, finn 1 sells XB, while finn 2 sells y. The problem with this arrangement is that fim1 1's pricing decision does not take into account the impact ofthe price ofxB on sales ofy. Similarly, finn 2 's pricing decision for the complementary product or service does not internalize the impact ofthe price ofy on sales ofxB' The result is suboptimal pricing. In contrast, exclusive licensing in volves coordinated pricing of the different products and services, as they are sold by the same finn. IS Therefore, when exclusive licensing is possible, it is the optimal deployment decision for a high-cost finn. 16 Nonexclusive Licensing. Consider now the situation where exclusive licensing is not possible. Assume also, for the moment, that finns are restricted to fixed-fee licensing contracts.
The Nash equilibrium of the nonexclusive licensing pricing game can be characterized as follows. Due to price competition between the two finns in XB and XE, fim1 1 supplies both products, charging prices phI < C2 and P}l < C2 (the superscript I indicates equilibrium under nonexclusive licensing).
Finn 
14. II1+2 is assumed to be concave in both arguments with a maximum at (p~ll PEl)'
15. From inspection of the first-order conditions, it can easily be v~rified that, in fact, independent selling leads to suboptimal pricing. As a result, II~~2 > II~s+2'
16. Exclusive licensing has two advantages over captive use: increased cost-efficiency and coordinated pricing of the basic and enhanced products. Exclusive licensing increases efficiency, because the enhanced product is produced at a lower cost by firm 1 than by firm 2. Exclusive licensing involves coordinated pricing, because firm 1 supplies both the basic product and the enhanced product.
Like independent selling, nonexclusive licensing allows for low cost production. However, nonexclusive licensing has both an advantage and a disadvantage relative to independent selling: while nonexclusive licensing involves coordinated pricing of the basic and enhanced prod ucts, it also introduces competition in the enhanced product. As we will see later, if the rent dissipation due to increased competition in the enhanced product is significant, joint profits are greater under inde pendent selling than under nonexclusive licensing.
To compare the equilibrium joint profits under independent selling (rr~s+2) an~nonexclusive licensing (rrl+ 2 ), it is convenient to fix CI and co.mpare rr I s +2 and rr ~ +2 for different values ofC2. Therefore, we define rr~~2 (C2) and rrl+ 2 (C2) for any given value of CI. Let us first charac terize two extreme cases.
If C2 is arbitrarily close to CI, joint profits are greater under inde pendent selling than under nonexclusive licensing, and, consequently, independent selling is the optimal deployment option. Under non exclusive licensing, the two firms compete in both products, and con sequently, joint profits are close to zero. Under independent selling, the two firms compete in the basic product, but firm 2 has a monopoly in y, making a positive profit. As a result, joint profits are greater than zero.
If C2 > P~l' j oint profits are greater under nonexclusive licensing than under independent selling and, consequently, nonexclusive licensing is the optimal deployment option. If C2 > P~l' firm 2 has no incentive to use the quality-improving innovation after licensing it nonexclusively to firm 1. The licensee n1ay charge a price P~l without inducing the licensor to compete in XE. Therefore, the license is de facto exclusive. Equilibrium prices and joint profits are the same as under exclusive licensing.
What happens for intermediate values of C2
, that is, if C2 is signifi cantly greater than CI but smaller than P~l? Our assumptions about continuity ofDB and DE and concavity ofthe profit functions ensure that both rrf~2(C2) and rr~+2(C2) are continuous in C2 and that rrl+ 2 (c2) is concave. We also know that rr}+2(C2) is increasing for C2 E ]CI' P~l] a!1~ constant. for C2 > P~l and that rr~~2(C2) is constant for C2 > P;;l' where p~~ is the equilibrium price firm 1 would charge under inde pendent selling ifit did not have to face the competition offirm 2 in XB.
T4e fact that rrl~2(c2) > rr}+2(C2) for C2 arbitrarily close to CI and rr~~2(C2) < rr}+2(C2) for C2 > PEl' together with the fact that both n;:~2(C2) and rrl+ 2 (c2) are continuous, imply that there is a value of C2, c 2 .' where the two functions intersect. A typical representation of rr:~2(C2) and rrl+ 2 (c2) is given in figure 1 . In figure 1 , we identify two regions: one where independent selling is the optimal deployment op tion (CI < C2 < c~) and one where nonexclusive licensing is the optimal deployment option (C2 > c~).
Ill+2
Independent The intuition is as follows. If finn 2 's cost disadvantage relative to finn 1 is small (i.e., for values of C2 sufficiently close to cd, rent dis sipation due to increased competition in the enhanced product under nonexclusive licensing is greater than losses due to lack of coordinated pricing under independent selling. Therefore, joint profits are greater under independent selling than under licensing, and, therefore, indepen dent selling is the optimal deployment decision. As C2 increases relative to Cl, rent dissipation due to competition in the enhanced product under nonexclusive licensing decreases. If finn 2 's cost disadvantage is big, rent dissipation due to competition in the enhanced product under non exclusive licensing is smaller than losses due to lack ofcoordinated pric ing under independent selling. If this is the case, joint profits are greater under nonexclusive licensing than under independent selling, and, there fore, nonexclusive licensing is the optimal deployment decision. 17 We now consider the case where the licensing contract nlay include a royalty. In general, this case involves a trade-off.
First, a royalty reduces the licensor's incentives to use the quality improving innovation after licensing occurs and thereby mitigates competition in the enhanced product. This is because using the inno vation cannibalizes the licensor's royalty revenues. Without a royalty, the licensor has the incentive to compete in the enhanced product wheneverPEl> C2. With a royalty r, the licensor may no longer have this incentive when PEl> C2 but PEl < C2 + r.
17. Note that in addition to increased cost efficiency and coordinated pricing ofXB and XE, nonexclusive licensing has a third effect relative to captive use: It introduces competition in XE' Under nonexclusive licensing, two firms can produce the enhanced product, the licensor and the licensee. Therefore, the licensee is constrained in the price it charges for the en hanced product by the licensor.
More specifically, assume that finn 1 sets the pair ofprices (PBI, PEl), where PEl < C2 + r. By not producing the enhanced product, finn 2 gets, through royalty payments, an amount, RP, given by (6) By producing the enhanced product, charging a price PE2 < PEl, finn 2 makes a profit rrf, equal to rrf = (PE2 -C2) Second, a royalty introduces a distortion in the pricing behavior ofthe licensee. It changes the marginal cost ofthe enhanced product on which finn 1 bases its decisions from CI to c~ CI + r.
Thus, whether the licensing contract should include a royalty or not is unclear, as it depends on the interplay of these two effects. However, there is a special case where the optimal licensing contract definitely in cludes a royalty, because it allows finns to replicate the exclusive li censing outcome. Indeed, under certain circumstances, a royalty r* == P~l -C2 eliminates finn 2 's incentives to compete in the enhanced prod uct for PBI == P~l and PEl == P~l' without introducing any distortion in the pricing decisions offinn 1.
18
Consider a royalty r* == P~1 -C2· If, for PBI == P~l and PEl == P~l' RP > rrf, for any PE2 < PEl, finn 1 may charge the exclusive licensing equilibrium prices without facing competition from finn 2 in the en hanced product. A royalty r* also changes the marginal cost CI to ci CI + r*. This implies that, without competition from finn 2 in XE, firm 1 would charge a price PEl > P~l' However, finn 1 cannot set a price PEl > P~l without inducing firm 2 to compete in the enhanced product, setting a price PE2 < PEl. Therefore, the best firm 1 can do is to set the pair of prices (P~l' P~l)' As a result, the royalty solves the problem of increased competition in XE due to nonexclusive licensing without in troducing a distortion in the pricing decisions offirm 1. Joint profits are the san1e as under exclusive licensing.
18. Under nonexclusive licensing, a royalty r* = P~l -C2 eliminates firm 2's incentive to compete in the enhanced product for PBI = P~l and PEl P~I' without introducing any distortion in the pricing decisions of firm 1, if and only if (1) IDEE I2:: IDB£!, (2) P~l C2, and (3) P~; C2 (the superscript r* indicates equilibrium under nonexclusive licensing with r r*). This result is shown in Appendix B. Under these conditions, the optimal licensing contract includes a royalty r r*. For example, when consumers' preferences are described by U 9q -P if the consumer consumes one unit of quality q and pays price P and by 0 otherwise (where the parameter 9 of taste for quality is uniformly distributed between 9' 2:: 0 and e" 9' + 1), a royalty r* eliminates firm 2's incentive to compete in the enhanced product for PBI = P~I and PBl = P~l' without introducing any distortion in the pricing decisions of firm 1. This preferences structure was first proposed by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) (see also Tirole, 1988, p. 296) . This paper uses a game-theoretic model to study how competitive con siderations affect the deployment ofquality-improving innovations, com paring captive use, independent selling, and licensing. We identify three underlying concerns that influence the choice among these deployment strategies: achieving cost-efficient production, ensuring coordinated pricing of the basic and enhanced products, and mitigating competition within products. We show that, as a result of the interplay of these effi ciency and competitive forces, both licensing and independent selling may be profit-maximizing strategies. Furthermore, it can easily be ver ified that, even though the effect oflicensing and independent selling on equilibrium prices and, hence, on consumer surplus is unclear, these deployment strategies may well increase social welfare. Figure 2 summarizes the results regarding the profit-maximizing de ployment strategy. In our model, captive use is optimal in only one case, where the innovating firm is also the most cost-efficient manufacturer. It is far from clear that the same firm, in general, excels in both dimen sions. According to Porter (1980) , successful firms usually have to com pete either on the basis of low costs or product differentiation: Firms that attempt to pursue both types of advantage simultaneously are al most guaranteed low profitability. As Caves (1984) puts it, "a sufficient source of exclusivity lies in managerial coordinating capacity and the need to select a system ofinternal organization, evaluation, and reward that is designed for optimal pursuit of the chosen strategy" (p. 127).19
19. Porter's argument has provoked a vigorous debate, for both empirical and conceptual reasons. The empirical evidence is mixed. In some industries, successful firms possess either a differentiation or cost leadership strategy, not both (e.g., Hambrick 1983; Dess and Davis 1984) . However, several empirical studies suggest that cost and differentiation advantages To the extent that Porter's argument is correct, our model suggests that captive use may often be dominated by the other deployment options. Put differently, in all cases where quality-improving innovations are generated by firms that are not the most cost-efficient producer in their industries, licensing or independent selling may be the optimal deploy ment option.
More specifically, our model indicates that, when the innovating firm is inefficient, exclusive licensing should be preferred whenever it is pos sible. When it is not possible to draw up exclusive licensing contracts, the choice between nonexclusive licensing and independent selling depends on the cost position of the firm. It should be pointed out, how ever, that, in such cases, the firm should always verify whether or not a special type oflicensing agreement (Lr*) can be devised, which enables the innovator to effectively replicate an exclusive license. Indeed, under specific conditions, an optimal royalty rate r* can be set that enables the firm to credibly and costlessly conlmit itself not to use the quality improving innovation. Since such an agreement replicates an exclusive license, it is preferable, whenever possible, to nonexclusive licensing or independent selling. Finally, if the cost disadvantage of the innovating firm becomes very big, this firm is no longer able to compete with the licensee, ensuring that the license is de facto exclusive.
The results summarized in figure 2 suggest that captive use ofa quality improving innovation is often not the optimal deployment option. There fore, according to the predictions of our model, in reality captive use should be a rare exception. These predictions seem to be at odds with reality. Firms often use their product enhancements captively in an at tempt to differentiate their products. How can we explain this mismatch between the model's implications and the realities of asset deployment?
The distance between the model and reality is explained, first of all, by a number ofmodeling choices. Our objective, in this paper, is to ana lyze how competitive considerations affect the deployment of quality improving innovations. Therefore, even though our model captures cost differences and market competition, it does not take into account a number of important factors that have been identified in the literature. Specifically, we ignore several insights from the transaction cost per spective (e.g., Williamson 1975 Williamson , 1985 Teece 1986 Teece , 1987 Hill 1992) . F or example, there may be uncertainty about the value of the innova tion, which could make licensing more problematic. Furthermore, it are not incompatible (e.g., Phillips, Chang and Buzzell 1983; Miller and Friesen 1986; and White 1986) . Two related factors may weaken the trade-off between cost and differentiation positions in an industry (e.g., Hill 1988; Porter 1996) . On the one hand, a firm with a differentiation advantage may increase market share, which then allows it to benefit from economies of scale, scope, and learning. On the other hand, the idea that higher quality or better performing products involve higher costs ignores the possibility that firms may be producing inefficiently. may be difficult to license an innovation without diffusing the general knowledge underlying the innovation to be transferred. This may allow the licensee to improve on the licensed innovation or to apply it to products for which it was not licensed. If these types of costs are sig nificant, they may reduce firms' incentives to choose a licensing strat egy, even if exclusive licensing is possible.
In addition, our model assumes very specific cost and demand structures. In particular, we assume that firms have constant marginal costs and that products XB and XE are vertically differentiated. While these assumptions are justified in a first effort to analyze how conlpet itive considerations affect the deployment of quality-improving inno vations, an important issue for further research is to verify to what extent our results depend on these assumptions. Two obvious extensions to the paper would be to consider a range of cost functions exhibiting in creasing marginal costs or a more general demand with horizontal and vertical components.
The mismatch between the model's implications and the realities of asset deployment may also be explained by a managerial bias towards captive use (e.g., Gabel 1984; Dierickx and Cool 1994) . As pointed out by several strategy researchers, this bias may result, first of all, from the persistence of strategies narrowly focused on pursuing competitive ad vantage in product markets. Ifthe firm's ultimate objective is to achieve a strong product market position, a captive use strategy is the natural choice. In such a strategy, the firnl uses its valuable assets to enhance its products only in an attempt to create a competitive advantage in product markets. In addition, a captive use strategy may result from the failure to correctly identify the real source of the firm's above-normal returns. Unless the specific assets responsible for the firm's superior earning potential have been explicitly identified and the different deployment alternatives carefully compared, competitive strategy is likely to be bi ased towards captive use.
The following example illustrates this point. As reported by Business Week (December 27, 1999, p. 20) , many major auto makers have re lied at some time or other on the automotive engineering capabilities of Porsche, the German producer ofluxury sports cars. For example, Porsche engineers helped DaimlerChrysler solve the instability problems suf fered by its compact A-Class cars and to develop its Smart microcar model; and Zafira, the compact van of Opel, General Motors German subsidiary, was engineered under contract by Porsche. At any time, one third of Porsche's designers and engineers are doing outside contract work for other companies, mostly carmakers. Providing automotive en gineering services has become a pillar of Porsche's business and a key part ofits growth strategy. Why have Porsche's executives been able to identify this profitable strategy? First of all, because they understood that Porsche is on the cutting edge of automotive engineering. More importantly, because they realized that a captive use strategy (i.e., the strategy of using the company's engineering capabilities only to build Porsche's luxury sports cars) would not be a profit maximizing strategy. They understood that the identification ofthe optimal deployment option requires firms to think beyond product market positioning and to address the broader question ofhow to fully exploit the potential rents associated with their valuable assets.
Whether the distance between the model and reality is explained by our modeling choices or by a managerial bias toward captive use can be assessed only empirically. Unfortunately, the deployment of quality improving innovations has not received sufficient attention in the em piricalliterature. Hence, the empirical validation ofthe results presented in this paper could be an interesting topic for further research.
As already mentioned, the model presented in this paper should be seen as a first effort to study how competitive considerations influence the deployment of quality-improving innovations. As suggested pre viously, two obvious extensions to the paper would be to consider a range of cost functions exhibiting increasing marginal costs or a more general demand with horizontal and vertical components. In addition, this work could be enriched by incorporating additional insights from the transaction cost perspective. Our nlodel can also be extended in several other ways.
First, while the model involves only two firms, it can easily be ex tended to three or more firms. The main results carry through without modification. Two clarifications are necessary, however. When exclu sive licensing is possible, the model suggests that a high-cost firm should license the quality-improving innovation exclusively to only one firm, the one with the lowest cost position in the production ofthe basic prod uct. Furthermore, captive use is optimal if and only if the innovator has the lowest cost position of all firms in the market. In our model, all innovating fimls that are not the most cost-efficient producer have the incentive to follow a licensing or independent selling strategy.
Second, this paper identifies incentives to share a quality-improving innovation with competitors or follow an independent selling strategy ex-post, that is, after the development of the innovation has been con cluded. An interesting extension of the paper would be to study the deployment decision ex ante, that is, while R&D efforts are still taking place. This seems to be a promising area for further research, because R&D and deployment decisions are clearly linked. For example, by licensing an innovation to other firms or by following an independent selling strategy, the innovating firm may be able to influence compet itors' incentives to develop a similar innovation.
Third, an important extension of the paper would be to formally model a broader range of collaborative arrangements (e.g., exclusive sourcing, joint ventures). Note, however, that these extensions can only further restrict the don1ain ofoptimality ofcaptive use, reinforcing a key conclusion of this paper: In the case of quality-improving innovations, the interplay of production efficiency and competitive considerations tends to favor other deployment strategies relative to captive use. Consider now that firm 2 follows an independent selling strategy. Assunle that, for PBI = P~l' firm 2 sets a price P; Pm. 
PEI_ PEl
Ignore for a moment the restriction onpEI' For P~*I P~I = C2, PEl is given by the corresponding first-order condition From the first-order condition, it is easy to verify that, without the restriction on PEb for any royalty r > 0, and in particular for r = r*, firm 1 would charge a price PEl > P~l' Consider now the restriction PEl ::; P~l' Due to the concavity of firm 1 's profit on PEl, the best firm 1 can do is to set P£*l = P~l'
The proof ofnecessity is straightforward and therefore simply sketched here. First relax the assumptionp~l C2. Ifp~l < C2, two things may happen: (a)p~*l C2 and (b) P~*l < C2· In case (a), we have P~*l P~l' In case (b), one can easily verifY by inspection of the first-order conditions that P~*l < P~l' In both cases, licensing introduces a distortion in the pricing decisions of the licensee. A similar argument can be developed for the assumption P~l = C2.
Clearly, if IDEEI<IDBEI, a royalty r = r* cannot be used as a means for firm 2 to credibly commit not to use the licensed technology iffirm 1 charges a price P~l . For PEl = P~l' firm 2 has the incentive to produce XE.
